* Rationale for suite order, from most important to least
* important rule:
*
- * -- Don't use 3DES if AES is available.
+ * -- Don't use 3DES if AES or ChaCha20 is available.
* -- Try to have Forward Secrecy (ECDHE suite) if possible.
* -- When not using Forward Secrecy, ECDH key exchange is
* better than RSA key exchange (slightly more expensive on the
* client, but much cheaper on the server, and it implies smaller
* messages).
- * -- GCM is better than CBC.
+ * -- ChaCha20+Poly1305 is better than AES/GCM (faster, smaller code).
+ * -- GCM is better than CCM and CBC. CCM is better than CBC.
+ * -- CCM is preferable over CCM_8 (with CCM_8, forgeries may succeed
+ * with probability 2^(-64)).
* -- AES-128 is preferred over AES-256 (AES-128 is already
* strong enough, and AES-256 is 40% more expensive).
*/
static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
*/
br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
(sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
- br_ssl_client_set_rsapub(cc, &br_rsa_i31_public);
- br_ssl_engine_set_rsavrfy(&cc->eng, &br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy);
- br_ssl_engine_set_ec(&cc->eng, &br_ec_prime_i31);
- br_ssl_engine_set_ecdsa(&cc->eng, &br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1);
- br_x509_minimal_set_rsa(xc, &br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy);
+ br_ssl_client_set_default_rsapub(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_rsavrfy(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_ecdsa(&cc->eng);
+ br_x509_minimal_set_rsa(xc, br_ssl_engine_get_rsavrfy(&cc->eng));
br_x509_minimal_set_ecdsa(xc,
- &br_ec_prime_i31, &br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1);
+ br_ssl_engine_get_ec(&cc->eng),
+ br_ssl_engine_get_ecdsa(&cc->eng));
/*
* Set supported hash functions, for the SSL engine and for the
br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha384(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha384_prf);
/*
- * Symmetric encryption. We use the "constant-time"
- * implementations, which are the safest.
- *
- * On architectures detected as "64-bit", use the 64-bit
- * versions (aes_ct64, ghash_ctmul64).
- */
-#if BR_64
- br_ssl_engine_set_aes_cbc(&cc->eng,
- &br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_vtable,
- &br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_vtable);
- br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(&cc->eng,
- &br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable);
- br_ssl_engine_set_ghash(&cc->eng,
- &br_ghash_ctmul64);
-#else
- br_ssl_engine_set_aes_cbc(&cc->eng,
- &br_aes_ct_cbcenc_vtable,
- &br_aes_ct_cbcdec_vtable);
- br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(&cc->eng,
- &br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable);
- br_ssl_engine_set_ghash(&cc->eng,
- &br_ghash_ctmul);
-#endif
- br_ssl_engine_set_des_cbc(&cc->eng,
- &br_des_ct_cbcenc_vtable,
- &br_des_ct_cbcdec_vtable);
-
- /*
- * Set the SSL record engines (CBC, GCM).
+ * Symmetric encryption. We use the "default" implementations
+ * (fastest among constant-time implementations).
*/
- br_ssl_engine_set_cbc(&cc->eng,
- &br_sslrec_in_cbc_vtable,
- &br_sslrec_out_cbc_vtable);
- br_ssl_engine_set_gcm(&cc->eng,
- &br_sslrec_in_gcm_vtable,
- &br_sslrec_out_gcm_vtable);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_cbc(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_ccm(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_des_cbc(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_chapol(&cc->eng);
}