/*
* This macro evaluates to a pointer to the current engine context.
*/
-#define ENG ((br_ssl_engine_context *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, cpu)))
+#define ENG ((br_ssl_engine_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, cpu)))
}
\ Read a 16-bit word from the context (address is offset in context).
cc: get16 ( addr -- val ) {
size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
- T0_PUSH(*(uint16_t *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
}
\ Read a 32-bit word from the context (address is offset in context).
cc: get32 ( addr -- val ) {
size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
- T0_PUSH(*(uint32_t *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
}
\ Set a byte in the context (address is offset in context).
\ Set a 16-bit word in the context (address is offset in context).
cc: set16 ( val addr -- ) {
size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
- *(uint16_t *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint16_t)T0_POP();
+ *(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint16_t)T0_POP();
}
\ Set a 32-bit word in the context (address is offset in context).
cc: set32 ( val addr -- ) {
size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
- *(uint32_t *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint32_t)T0_POP();
+ *(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint32_t)T0_POP();
}
\ Define a word that evaluates as an address of a field within the
read16 skip-blob ;
\ Open a substructure: the inner structure length is checked against,
-\ and substracted, from the output structure current limit.
+\ and subtracted, from the output structure current limit.
: open-elt ( lim len -- lim-outer lim-inner )
dup { len }
- dup 0< if ERR_BAD_PARAM fail then
\ 3 AES-128/GCM
\ 4 AES-256/GCM
\ 5 ChaCha20/Poly1305
+\ 6 AES-128/CCM
+\ 7 AES-256/CCM
+\ 8 AES-128/CCM8
+\ 9 AES-256/CCM8
\ -- MAC algorithm:
\ 0 none (for suites with AEAD encryption)
\ 2 HMAC/SHA-1
hexb| C031 3304 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
hexb| C032 3405 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+hexb| C09C 0604 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
+hexb| C09D 0704 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+hexb| C0A0 0804 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
+hexb| C0A1 0904 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
+hexb| C0AC 2604 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
+hexb| C0AD 2704 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+hexb| C0AE 2804 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
+hexb| C0AF 2904 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
+
hexb| CCA8 1504 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
hexb| CCA9 2504 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
: prf-id ( suite -- id )
cipher-suite-to-elements 15 and ;
+\ Test whether a cipher suite is only for TLS-1.2. Cipher suites that
+\ can be used with TLS-1.0 or 1.1 use HMAC/SHA-1. RFC do not formally
+\ forbid using a CBC-based TLS-1.2 cipher suite, e.g. based on HMAC/SHA-256,
+\ with older protocol versions; however, servers should not do that, since
+\ it may confuse clients. Since the server code does not try such games,
+\ for consistency, the client should reject it as well (normal servers
+\ don't do that, so any attempt is a sign of foul play).
+: use-tls12? ( suite -- bool )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 0xF0 and 0x20 <> ;
+
\ Switch to negotiated security parameters for input or output.
: switch-encryption ( is-client for-input -- )
{ for-input }
then
endof
- ERR_BAD_PARAM fail
+ \ Now we only have AES/CCM suites (6 to 9). Since the
+ \ input is between 0 and 15, and we checked values 0 to 5,
+ \ we only need to reject values larger than 9.
+ dup 9 > if
+ ERR_BAD_PARAM fail
+ then
+
+ \ Stack: is_client prf_id mac_id cipher_id
+ \ We want to remove the mac_id (it is zero for CCM suites)
+ \ and replace the cipher_id with the key and tag lengths.
+ \ The following table applies:
+ \ id key length tag length
+ \ 6 16 16
+ \ 7 32 16
+ \ 8 16 8
+ \ 9 32 8
+ swap drop
+ dup 1 and 4 << 16 + swap
+ 8 and 16 swap -
+ for-input if
+ switch-aesccm-in
+ else
+ switch-aesccm-out
+ then
+ ret
endcase
;
br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id);
}
+cc: switch-aesccm-out ( is_client prf_id cipher_key_len tag_len -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len, tag_len;
+
+ tag_len = T0_POP();
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctrcbc, cipher_key_len, tag_len);
+}
+
+cc: switch-aesccm-in ( is_client prf_id cipher_key_len tag_len -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len, tag_len;
+
+ tag_len = T0_POP();
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctrcbc, cipher_key_len, tag_len);
+}
+
\ Write Finished message.
: write-Finished ( from_client -- )
compute-Finished