do_ecdh(ctx, prf_id, cpoint, cpoint_len);
}
+static size_t
+hash_data(br_ssl_server_context *ctx,
+ void *dst, int hash_id, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *hf;
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+
+ if (hash_id == 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[36];
+
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, br_md5_ID);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, tmp);
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, br_sha1_ID);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, tmp + 16);
+ memcpy(dst, tmp, 36);
+ return 36;
+ } else {
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, hash_id);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, dst);
+ return (hf->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Do the ECDHE key exchange (part 1: generation of transient key, and
* computing of the point to send to the client). Returned value is the
static int
do_ecdhe_part1(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int curve)
{
- int hash;
+ unsigned algo_id;
unsigned mask;
const unsigned char *order;
size_t olen, glen;
- br_multihash_context mhc;
- unsigned char head[4];
size_t hv_len, sig_len;
if (!((ctx->eng.iec->supported_curves >> curve) & 1)) {
/*
* Compute our ECDH point.
*/
-#if 0
-/* obsolete */
- generator = ctx->eng.iec->generator(curve, &glen);
- memcpy(ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, generator, glen);
- ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len = glen;
- if (!ctx->eng.iec->mul(ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, glen,
- ctx->ecdhe_key, olen, curve))
- {
- return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
- }
-#endif
glen = ctx->eng.iec->mulgen(ctx->eng.ecdhe_point,
ctx->ecdhe_key, olen, curve);
ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len = glen;
/*
- * Compute the signature.
+ * Assemble the message to be signed, and possibly hash it.
*/
- br_multihash_zero(&mhc);
- br_multihash_copyimpl(&mhc, &ctx->eng.mhash);
- br_multihash_init(&mhc);
- br_multihash_update(&mhc,
- ctx->eng.client_random, sizeof ctx->eng.client_random);
- br_multihash_update(&mhc,
- ctx->eng.server_random, sizeof ctx->eng.server_random);
- head[0] = 3;
- head[1] = 0;
- head[2] = curve;
- head[3] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
- br_multihash_update(&mhc, head, sizeof head);
- br_multihash_update(&mhc,
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad, ctx->eng.client_random, 32);
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad + 32, ctx->eng.server_random, 32);
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 0] = 0x03;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 1] = 0x00;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 2] = curve;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 3] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad + 64 + 4,
ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len);
- hash = ctx->sign_hash_id;
- if (hash) {
- hv_len = br_multihash_out(&mhc, hash, ctx->eng.pad);
+ hv_len = 64 + 4 + ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ algo_id = ctx->sign_hash_id;
+ if (algo_id >= (unsigned)0xFF00) {
+ hv_len = hash_data(ctx, ctx->eng.pad, algo_id & 0xFF,
+ ctx->eng.pad, hv_len);
if (hv_len == 0) {
return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
}
- } else {
- if (!br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_md5_ID, ctx->eng.pad)
- || !br_multihash_out(&mhc,
- br_sha1_ID, ctx->eng.pad + 16))
- {
- return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
- }
- hv_len = 36;
}
+
sig_len = (*ctx->policy_vtable)->do_sign(ctx->policy_vtable,
- hash, hv_len, ctx->eng.pad, sizeof ctx->eng.pad);
+ algo_id, ctx->eng.pad, hv_len, sizeof ctx->eng.pad);
return sig_len ? (int)sig_len : -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
}
\ Open extension value.
read16 open-elt
- read-list-sign-algos addr-hashes set16
+ read-list-sign-algos addr-hashes set32
\ Close extension value.
close-elt ;
x = (*CTX->policy_vtable)->choose(
CTX->policy_vtable, CTX, &choices);
ENG->session.cipher_suite = choices.cipher_suite;
- CTX->sign_hash_id = choices.hash_id;
+ CTX->sign_hash_id = choices.algo_id;
ENG->chain = choices.chain;
ENG->chain_len = choices.chain_len;
T0_PUSHi(-(x != 0));
\ -- client is reputed to know RSA and ECDSA, both with SHA-1
\ -- the default elliptic curve is P-256 (secp256r1, id = 23)
0 addr-server_name set8
- 0x404 addr-hashes set16
+ 0x0404 addr-hashes set32
0x800000 addr-curves set32
\ Process extensions, if any.
\ Filter hash function support by what the server also supports.
\ If no common hash function remains with RSA and/or ECDSA, then
\ the corresponding ECDHE suites are not possible.
- supported-hash-functions drop 257 *
- addr-hashes get16 and dup addr-hashes set16
+ supported-hash-functions drop 257 * 0xFFFF0000 or
+ addr-hashes get32 and dup addr-hashes set32
\ In 'can-ecdhe', bit 12 is set if ECDHE_RSA is possible, bit 13 is
\ set if ECDHE_ECDSA is possible.
dup 0xFF and 0<> neg
\ If TLS-1.2+, write hash and signature identifiers.
tls1.2+ if
- \ Hash identifier is in the sign_hash_id field.
- addr-sign_hash_id get8 write8
- \ 'use-rsa-ecdhe?' returns -1 for RSA, 0 for ECDSA.
- \ The byte on the wire shall be 1 for RSA, 3 for ECDSA.
- addr-cipher_suite get16 use-rsa-ecdhe? 1 << 3 + write8
+ \ sign_hash_id contains either a hash identifier,
+ \ or the complete 16-bit value to write.
+ addr-sign_hash_id get16
+ dup 0xFF00 < if
+ write16
+ else
+ 0xFF and write8
+ \ 'use-rsa-ecdhe?' returns -1 for RSA, 0 for
+ \ ECDSA. The byte on the wire shall be 1 for RSA,
+ \ 3 for ECDSA.
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 use-rsa-ecdhe? 1 << 3 + write8
+ then
then
\ Signature.
projects / BearSSL / blobdiff