Added support for client certificates (both client-side and server-side, but still...

[BearSSL] / src / x509 / x509_minimal.t0

diff --git a/src/x509/x509_minimal.t0 b/src/x509/x509_minimal.t0
index bdb3e18..385972b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/x509/x509_minimal.t0
+++ b/src/x509/x509_minimal.t0
@@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ br_x509_minimal_init(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
 }
 
 static void
-xm_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx,
-       unsigned expected_key_type, const char *server_name)
+xm_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx, const char *server_name)
 {
        br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
 
@@ -200,7 +199,6 @@ xm_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx,
        cc->cpu.dp = cc->dp_stack;
        cc->cpu.rp = cc->rp_stack;
        br_x509_minimal_init_main(&cc->cpu);
-       cc->expected_key_type = expected_key_type;
        if (server_name == NULL || *server_name == 0) {
                cc->server_name = NULL;
        } else {
@@ -269,7 +267,7 @@ xm_end_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx)
 }
 
 static const br_x509_pkey *
-xm_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx)
+xm_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx, unsigned *usages)
 {
        br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
 
@@ -277,6 +275,9 @@ xm_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx)
        if (cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_OK
                || cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_NOT_TRUSTED)
        {
+               if (usages != NULL) {
+                       *usages = cc->key_usages;
+               }
                return &((br_x509_minimal_context *)ctx)->pkey;
        } else {
                return NULL;
@@ -472,7 +473,7 @@ cc: zero-server-name ( -- bool ) {
        T0_PUSHi(-(CTX->server_name == NULL));
 }
 
-addr: expected_key_type
+addr: key_usages
 addr: cert_sig
 addr: cert_sig_len
 addr: cert_signer_key_type
@@ -705,7 +706,7 @@ cc: check-direct-trust ( -- ) {
                if (ta->flags & BR_X509_TA_CA) {
                        continue;
                }
-               hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn, ta->dn_len, hashed_DN);
+               hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn.data, ta->dn.len, hashed_DN);
                if (memcmp(hashed_DN, CTX->current_dn_hash, DNHASH_LEN)) {
                        continue;
                }
@@ -765,7 +766,7 @@ cc: check-trust-anchor-CA ( -- ) {
                if (!(ta->flags & BR_X509_TA_CA)) {
                        continue;
                }
-               hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn, ta->dn_len, hashed_DN);
+               hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn.data, ta->dn.len, hashed_DN);
                if (memcmp(hashed_DN, CTX->saved_dn_hash, DNHASH_LEN)) {
                        continue;
                }
@@ -892,20 +893,14 @@ OID: subjectInfoAccess             1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
 
 \ Process a Key Usage extension.
 \ For the EE certificate:
-\   -- if the expected key usage is "key exchange", then the extension
-\      must contain either keyEncipherment (2) or dataEncipherment (3);
-\   -- if the expected key usage is "signature", then the extension
-\      must contain either digitalSignature (0) or nonRepudiation (1).
+\   -- if the key usage contains keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3)
+\      or keyAgreement (4), then the "key exchange" usage is allowed;
+\   -- if the key usage contains digitalSignature (0) or nonRepudiation (1),
+\      then the "signature" usage is allowed.
 \ For CA certificates, the extension must contain keyCertSign (5).
 : process-keyUsage ( lim ee -- lim )
-       \ Compute flags, depending on EE status and expected key usage.
-       \ This is a mask of bits in the first byte.
-       if
-               addr-expected_key_type get8 0x10 and if 0x30 else 0xC0 then
-       else
-               0x04
-       then
-       { mask }
+       { ee }
+
        \ Read tag for the BIT STRING and open it.
        read-tag 0x03 check-tag-primitive
        read-length-open-elt
@@ -919,7 +914,20 @@ OID: subjectInfoAccess             1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
                1 of read8 ign >> ign << endof
                drop read8 0
        endcase
-       mask and ifnot ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE fail then
+
+       \ Check bits.
+       ee if
+               \ EE: get usages.
+               0
+               over 0x38 and if 0x10 or then
+               swap 0xC0 and if 0x20 or then
+               addr-key_usages set8
+       else
+               \ Not EE: keyCertSign must be set.
+               0x04 and ifnot ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE fail then
+       then
+
+       \ We don't care about subsequent bytes.
        skip-close-elt ;
 
 \ Process a Subject Alt Name extension. Returned value is a boolean set
@@ -1070,15 +1078,8 @@ OID: subjectInfoAccess             1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
 
        \ Process public key.
        ee if
-               \ For the EE certificate, check that the key type
-               \ matches that which was expected, then copy the
-               \ data to the relevant buffer.
-               addr-expected_key_type get8 0x0F and
-               dup if
-                       pkey-type = ifnot ERR_X509_WRONG_KEY_TYPE fail then
-               else
-                       drop
-               then
+               \ For the EE certificate, copy the key data to the
+               \ relevant buffer.
                pkey-type case
                        KEYTYPE_RSA of nlen elen copy-ee-rsa-pkey endof
                        KEYTYPE_EC of curve qlen copy-ee-ec-pkey endof
@@ -1286,6 +1287,9 @@ OID: subjectInfoAccess             1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
        check-trust-anchor-CA ;
 
 : main
+       \ Unless restricted by a Key Usage extension, all usages are
+       \ deemed allowed.
+       0x30 addr-key_usages set8
        -1 decode-certificate
        co
        begin