1 \ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
3 \ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
4 \ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
5 \ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
6 \ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
7 \ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
8 \ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
9 \ the following conditions:
11 \ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
12 \ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
14 \ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
15 \ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
16 \ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
17 \ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
18 \ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
19 \ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
20 \ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
23 \ ----------------------------------------------------------------------
24 \ Handshake processing code, for the client.
25 \ The common T0 code (ssl_hs_common.t0) shall be read first.
30 * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the client context, under that
31 * specific name. It must be noted that since the engine context is the
32 * first field of the br_ssl_client_context structure ('eng'), then
33 * pointers values of both types are interchangeable, modulo an
34 * appropriate cast. This also means that "adresses" computed as offsets
35 * within the structure work for both kinds of context.
37 #define CTX ((br_ssl_client_context *)ENG)
40 * Generate the pre-master secret for RSA key exchange, and encrypt it
41 * with the server's public key. Returned value is either the encrypted
42 * data length (in bytes), or -x on error, with 'x' being an error code.
44 * This code assumes that the public key has been already verified (it
45 * was properly obtained by the X.509 engine, and it has the right type,
46 * i.e. it is of type RSA and suitable for encryption).
49 make_pms_rsa(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, int prf_id)
51 const br_x509_class **xc;
52 const br_x509_pkey *pk;
53 const unsigned char *n;
57 xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
58 pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc);
61 * Compute actual RSA key length, in case there are leading zeros.
64 nlen = pk->key.rsa.nlen;
65 while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) {
71 * We need at least 59 bytes (48 bytes for pre-master secret, and
72 * 11 bytes for the PKCS#1 type 2 padding). Note that the X.509
73 * minimal engine normally blocks RSA keys shorter than 128 bytes,
74 * so this is mostly for public keys provided explicitly by the
78 return -BR_ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY;
80 if (nlen > sizeof ctx->eng.pad) {
81 return -BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
87 pms = ctx->eng.pad + nlen - 48;
88 br_enc16be(pms, ctx->eng.version_max);
89 br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, pms + 2, 46);
90 br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, pms, 48);
93 * Apply PKCS#1 type 2 padding.
95 ctx->eng.pad[0] = 0x00;
96 ctx->eng.pad[1] = 0x02;
97 ctx->eng.pad[nlen - 49] = 0x00;
98 br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, ctx->eng.pad + 2, nlen - 51);
99 for (u = 2; u < nlen - 49; u ++) {
100 while (ctx->eng.pad[u] == 0) {
101 br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng,
102 &ctx->eng.pad[u], 1);
107 * Compute RSA encryption.
109 if (!ctx->irsapub(ctx->eng.pad, nlen, &pk->key.rsa)) {
110 return -BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
116 * OID for hash functions in RSA signatures.
118 static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA1[] = {
119 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A
122 static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA224[] = {
123 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04
126 static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA256[] = {
127 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01
130 static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA384[] = {
131 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02
134 static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA512[] = {
135 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03
138 static const unsigned char *HASH_OID[] = {
147 * Check the RSA signature on the ServerKeyExchange message.
148 * hash hash function ID (2 to 6), or 0 for MD5+SHA-1 (with RSA only)
149 * use_rsa non-zero for RSA signature, zero for ECDSA
150 * sig_len signature length (in bytes); signature value is in the pad
151 * Returned value is 0 on success, or an error code.
154 verify_SKE_sig(br_ssl_client_context *ctx,
155 int hash, int use_rsa, size_t sig_len)
157 const br_x509_class **xc;
158 const br_x509_pkey *pk;
159 br_multihash_context mhc;
160 unsigned char hv[64], head[4];
163 xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
164 pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc);
165 br_multihash_zero(&mhc);
166 br_multihash_copyimpl(&mhc, &ctx->eng.mhash);
167 br_multihash_init(&mhc);
168 br_multihash_update(&mhc,
169 ctx->eng.client_random, sizeof ctx->eng.client_random);
170 br_multihash_update(&mhc,
171 ctx->eng.server_random, sizeof ctx->eng.server_random);
174 head[2] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
175 head[3] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
176 br_multihash_update(&mhc, head, sizeof head);
177 br_multihash_update(&mhc,
178 ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len);
180 hv_len = br_multihash_out(&mhc, hash, hv);
182 return BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
185 if (!br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_md5_ID, hv)
186 || !br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_sha1_ID, hv + 16))
188 return BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
193 unsigned char tmp[64];
194 const unsigned char *hash_oid;
197 hash_oid = HASH_OID[hash - 2];
201 if (!ctx->irsavrfy(ctx->eng.pad, sig_len,
202 hash_oid, hv_len, &pk->key.rsa, tmp)
203 || memcmp(tmp, hv, hv_len) != 0)
205 return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
208 if (!ctx->iecdsa(ctx->eng.iec, hv, hv_len, &pk->key.ec,
209 ctx->eng.pad, sig_len))
211 return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
218 * Perform client-size ECDH (or ECDHE). The point that should be sent to
219 * the server is written in the pad; returned value is either the point
220 * length (in bytes), or -x on error, with 'x' being an error code.
222 * The point _from_ the server is taken from ecdhe_point[] if 'ecdhe'
223 * is non-zero, or from the X.509 engine context if 'ecdhe' is zero
227 make_pms_ecdh(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, unsigned ecdhe, int prf_id)
230 unsigned char key[66], point[133];
231 const unsigned char *generator, *order, *point_src;
232 size_t glen, olen, point_len;
236 curve = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
237 point_src = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point;
238 point_len = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
240 const br_x509_class **xc;
241 const br_x509_pkey *pk;
243 xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
244 pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc);
245 curve = pk->key.ec.curve;
246 point_src = pk->key.ec.q;
247 point_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
249 if ((ctx->eng.iec->supported_curves & ((uint32_t)1 << curve)) == 0) {
250 return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
254 * We need to generate our key, as a non-zero random value which
255 * is lower than the curve order, in a "large enough" range. We
256 * force top bit to 0 and bottom bit to 1, which guarantees that
257 * the value is in the proper range.
259 order = ctx->eng.iec->order(curve, &olen);
261 while (mask >= order[0]) {
264 br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, key, olen);
266 key[olen - 1] |= 0x01;
269 * Compute the common ECDH point, whose X coordinate is the
272 generator = ctx->eng.iec->generator(curve, &glen);
273 if (glen != point_len) {
274 return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
277 memcpy(point, point_src, glen);
278 if (!ctx->eng.iec->mul(point, glen, key, olen, curve)) {
279 return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
283 * The pre-master secret is the X coordinate.
285 br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, point + 1, glen >> 1);
287 memcpy(point, generator, glen);
288 if (!ctx->eng.iec->mul(point, glen, key, olen, curve)) {
289 return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
291 memcpy(ctx->eng.pad, point, glen);
297 \ =======================================================================
301 "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
302 0 8191 "offsetof(br_ssl_client_context, " field + ")" + make-CX
303 postpone literal postpone ; ;
305 \ Length of the Secure Renegotiation extension. This is 5 for the
306 \ first handshake, 17 for a renegotiation (if the server supports the
307 \ extension), or 0 if we know that the server does not support the
309 : ext-reneg-length ( -- n )
310 addr-reneg get8 dup if 1 - 17 * else drop 5 then ;
312 \ Length of SNI extension.
313 : ext-sni-length ( -- len )
314 addr-server_name strlen dup if 9 + then ;
316 \ Length of Maximum Fragment Length extension.
317 : ext-frag-length ( -- len )
318 addr-log_max_frag_len get8 14 = if 0 else 5 then ;
320 \ Test support for RSA signatures.
321 cc: supports-rsa-sign? ( -- bool ) {
322 T0_PUSHi(-(CTX->irsavrfy != 0));
325 \ Test support for ECDSA signatures.
326 cc: supports-ecdsa? ( -- bool ) {
327 T0_PUSHi(-(CTX->iecdsa != 0));
330 \ Length of Signatures extension.
331 : ext-signatures-length ( -- len )
332 supported-hash-functions { x } drop
334 supports-rsa-sign? if x + then
335 supports-ecdsa? if x + then
336 dup if 1 << 6 + then ;
338 \ Write supported hash functions ( sign -- )
341 supported-hash-functions drop
342 \ We advertise hash functions in the following preference order:
343 \ SHA-256 SHA-224 SHA-384 SHA-512 SHA-1
345 \ -- SHA-256 and SHA-224 are more efficient on 32-bit architectures
346 \ -- SHA-1 is less than ideally collision-resistant
347 dup 0x10 and if 4 write8 sign write8 then
348 dup 0x08 and if 3 write8 sign write8 then
349 dup 0x20 and if 5 write8 sign write8 then
350 dup 0x40 and if 6 write8 sign write8 then
351 0x04 and if 2 write8 sign write8 then ;
353 \ Length of Supported Curves extension.
354 : ext-supported-curves-length ( -- len )
355 supported-curves dup if
364 \ Length of Supported Point Formats extension.
365 : ext-point-format-length ( -- len )
366 supported-curves if 6 else 0 then ;
368 \ Write handshake message: ClientHello
369 : write-ClientHello ( -- )
370 { ; total-ext-length }
372 \ Compute length for extensions (without the general two-byte header)
373 ext-reneg-length ext-sni-length + ext-frag-length +
374 ext-signatures-length +
375 ext-supported-curves-length + ext-point-format-length +
381 \ Compute and write length
382 39 addr-session_id_len get8 + addr-suites_num get8 1 << +
383 total-ext-length if 2+ total-ext-length + then
387 addr-version_max get16 write16
390 addr-client_random 4 bzero
391 addr-client_random 4 + 28 mkrand
392 addr-client_random 32 write-blob
395 addr-session_id addr-session_id_len get8 write-blob-head8
397 \ Supported cipher suites. We also check here that we indeed
398 \ support all these suites.
399 addr-suites_num get8 dup 1 << write16
404 dup suite-supported? ifnot ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
410 \ Compression methods (only "null" compression)
415 total-ext-length write16
417 0xFF01 write16 \ extension type (0xFF01)
419 ext-reneg-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
420 1- write-blob-head8 \ verify data
423 0x0000 write16 \ extension type (0)
425 ext-sni-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
426 2 - dup write16 \ ServerNameList length
427 0 write8 \ name type: host_name
428 3 - write-blob-head16 \ the name itself
431 0x0001 write16 \ extension type (1)
432 0x0001 write16 \ extension length
433 addr-log_max_frag_len get8 8 - write8
435 ext-signatures-length if
436 0x000D write16 \ extension type (13)
437 ext-signatures-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
438 2 - write16 \ list length
439 supports-ecdsa? if 3 write-hashes then
440 supports-rsa-sign? if 1 write-hashes then
442 \ TODO: add an API to specify preference order for curves.
443 \ Right now we use increasing id order, which makes P-256
444 \ the preferred curve.
445 ext-supported-curves-length dup if
446 0x000A write16 \ extension type (10)
447 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
448 2- write16 \ list length
451 dup2 >> 1 and if dup write16 then
458 ext-point-format-length if
459 0x000B write16 \ extension type (11)
460 0x0002 write16 \ extension length
461 0x0100 write16 \ value: 1 format: uncompressed
466 \ =======================================================================
468 \ Parse server SNI extension. If present, then it should be empty.
469 : read-server-sni ( lim -- lim )
470 read16 if ERR_BAD_SNI fail then ;
472 \ Parse server Max Fragment Length extension. If present, then it should
473 \ advertise the same length as the client. Note that whether the server
474 \ sends it or not changes nothing for us: we won't send any record larger
475 \ than the advertised value anyway, and we will accept incoming records
476 \ up to our input buffer length.
477 : read-server-frag ( lim -- lim )
478 read16 1 = ifnot ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN fail then
479 read8 8 + addr-log_max_frag_len get8 = ifnot ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN fail then ;
481 \ Parse server Secure Renegotiation extension. This is called only if
482 \ the client sent that extension, so we only have two cases to
483 \ distinguish: first handshake, and renegotiation; in the latter case,
484 \ we know that the server supports the extension, otherwise the client
485 \ would not have sent it.
486 : read-server-reneg ( lim -- lim )
488 addr-reneg get8 ifnot
489 \ "reneg" is 0, so this is a first handshake. The server's
490 \ extension MUST be empty. We also learn that the server
491 \ supports the extension.
492 1 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
493 read8 0 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
496 \ "reneg" is non-zero, and we sent an extension, so it must
497 \ be 2 and this is a renegotiation. We must verify that
498 \ the extension contents have length exactly 24 bytes and
499 \ match the saved client and server "Finished".
500 25 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
501 read8 24 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
502 addr-pad 24 read-blob
503 addr-saved_finished addr-pad 24 memcmp ifnot
504 ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail
508 \ Save a value in a 16-bit field, or check it in case of session resumption.
509 : check-resume ( val addr resume -- )
510 if get16 = ifnot ERR_RESUME_MISMATCH fail then else set16 then ;
512 cc: DEBUG-BLOB ( addr len -- ) {
513 extern int printf(const char *fmt, ...);
515 size_t len = T0_POP();
516 unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
520 for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
524 printf(" %02x", buf[u]);
529 \ Parse incoming ServerHello. Returned value is true (-1) on session
531 : read-ServerHello ( -- bool )
532 \ Get header, and check message type.
533 read-handshake-header 2 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
535 \ Get protocol version.
537 version addr-version_min get16 < version addr-version_max get16 > or if
538 ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION fail
541 \ Enforce chosen version for subsequent records in both directions.
542 version addr-version_in get16 <> if ERR_BAD_VERSION fail then
543 version addr-version_out set16
546 addr-server_random 32 read-blob
548 \ The "session resumption" flag.
553 idlen 32 > if ERR_OVERSIZED_ID fail then
554 addr-pad idlen read-blob
555 idlen addr-session_id_len get8 = idlen 0 > and if
556 addr-session_id addr-pad idlen memcmp if
557 \ Server session ID is non-empty and matches what
558 \ we sent, so this is a session resumption.
562 addr-session_id addr-pad idlen memcpy
563 idlen addr-session_id_len set8
566 version addr-version resume check-resume
568 \ Cipher suite. We check that it is part of the list of cipher
569 \ suites that we advertised.
570 \ read16 { suite ; found }
572 \ addr-suites_buf dup addr-suites_num get8 1 << +
575 \ suite = found or >found
577 \ 2drop found ifnot ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
579 dup scan-suite 0< if ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
580 addr-cipher_suite resume check-resume
582 \ Compression method. Should be 0 (no compression).
583 read8 if ERR_BAD_COMPRESSION fail then
585 \ Parse extensions (if any). If there is no extension, then the
586 \ read limit (on the TOS) should be 0 at that point.
588 \ Length of extension list.
592 \ Enumerate extensions. For each of them, check that we
593 \ sent an extension of that type, and did not see it
594 \ yet; and then process it.
595 ext-sni-length { ok-sni }
596 ext-reneg-length { ok-reneg }
597 ext-frag-length { ok-frag }
598 ext-signatures-length { ok-signatures }
599 ext-supported-curves-length { ok-curves }
600 ext-point-format-length { ok-points }
604 \ Server Name Indication. The server may
605 \ send such an extension if it uses the SNI
606 \ from the client, but that "response
607 \ extension" is supposed to be empty.
610 ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
616 \ Max Frag Length. The contents shall be
617 \ a single byte whose value matches the one
618 \ sent by the client.
621 ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
627 \ Secure Renegotiation.
630 ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
636 \ Signature Algorithms.
637 \ Normally, the server should never send this
638 \ extension (so says RFC 5246 #7.4.1.4.1),
639 \ but some existing servers do.
642 ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
651 ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
657 \ Supported Point Formats.
660 ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
666 ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
670 \ If we sent a secure renegotiation extension but did not
671 \ receive a response, then the server does not support
672 \ secure renegotiation. This is a hard failure if this
673 \ is a renegotiation.
675 ok-reneg 5 > if ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
684 cc: x509-start-chain ( expected-key-type -- ) {
685 const br_x509_class *xc;
687 xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
688 xc->start_chain(ENG->x509ctx, T0_POP(), ENG->server_name);
691 cc: x509-start-cert ( length -- ) {
692 const br_x509_class *xc;
694 xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
695 xc->start_cert(ENG->x509ctx, T0_POP());
698 cc: x509-append ( length -- ) {
699 const br_x509_class *xc;
702 xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
704 xc->append(ENG->x509ctx, ENG->pad, len);
707 cc: x509-end-cert ( -- ) {
708 const br_x509_class *xc;
710 xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
711 xc->end_cert(ENG->x509ctx);
714 cc: x509-end-chain ( -- err ) {
715 const br_x509_class *xc;
717 xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
718 T0_PUSH(xc->end_chain(ENG->x509ctx));
722 : read-Certificate ( -- )
723 \ Get header, and check message type.
724 read-handshake-header 11 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
726 \ Start processing the chain through the X.509 engine.
727 addr-cipher_suite get16 expected-key-type
730 \ Total chain length is a 24-bit integer.
737 \ We read the certificate by chunks through the pad, so
738 \ as to use the existing reading function (read-blob)
739 \ that also ensures proper hashing.
742 dup 256 > if 256 else dup then { len }
743 addr-pad len read-blob
750 \ We must close the chain AND the handshake message.
754 \ Chain processing is finished; get the error code.
756 dup if fail then drop
759 \ Verify signature on ECDHE point sent by the server.
760 \ 'hash' is the hash function to use (1 to 6, or 0 for RSA with MD5+SHA-1)
761 \ 'use-rsa' is 0 for ECDSA, -1 for for RSA
762 \ 'sig-len' is the signature length (in bytes)
763 \ The signature itself is in the pad.
764 cc: verify-SKE-sig ( hash use-rsa sig-len -- err ) {
765 size_t sig_len = T0_POP();
766 int use_rsa = T0_POPi();
767 int hash = T0_POPi();
769 T0_PUSH(verify_SKE_sig(CTX, hash, use_rsa, sig_len));
772 \ Parse ServerKeyExchange
773 : read-ServerKeyExchange ( -- )
774 \ Get header, and check message type.
775 read-handshake-header 12 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
777 \ We expect a named curve, and we must support it.
778 read8 3 = ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
779 read16 dup addr-ecdhe_curve set8
780 dup 32 >= if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
781 supported-curves swap >> 1 and ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
783 \ Read the server point.
785 dup 133 > if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
786 dup addr-ecdhe_point_len set8
787 addr-ecdhe_point swap read-blob
789 \ If using TLS-1.2+, then the hash function and signature algorithm
790 \ are explicitly provided; the signature algorithm must match what
791 \ the cipher suite specifies. With TLS-1.0 and 1.1, the signature
792 \ algorithm is inferred from the cipher suite, and the hash is
793 \ either MD5+SHA-1 (for RSA signatures) or SHA-1 (for ECDSA).
794 addr-version get16 0x0303 >= { tls1.2+ }
795 addr-cipher_suite get16 use-rsa-ecdhe? { use-rsa }
798 \ Read hash function; accept only the SHA-* identifiers
799 \ (from SHA-1 to SHA-512, no MD5 here).
801 dup dup 2 < swap 6 > or if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
804 \ Get expected signature algorithm and compare with what
805 \ the server just sent. Expected value is 1 for RSA, 3
806 \ for ECDSA. Note that 'use-rsa' evaluates to -1 for RSA,
808 use-rsa 1 << 3 + = ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
810 \ For MD5+SHA-1, we set 'hash' to 0.
811 use-rsa if 0 >hash then
814 \ Read signature into the pad.
815 read16 dup { sig-len }
817 dup 512 > if ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail then
818 addr-pad swap read-blob
821 hash use-rsa sig-len verify-SKE-sig
822 dup if fail then drop
826 \ Parse CertificateRequest. Header has already been read.
827 : read-contents-CertificateRequest ( lim -- )
828 \ TODO: implement client certificates. Right now, we simply
829 \ drop the complete message.
830 begin dup while read8 drop repeat drop ;
832 \ Write an empty Certificate message.
833 : write-empty-Certificate ( -- )
834 11 write8 3 write24 0 write24 ;
836 cc: do-rsa-encrypt ( prf_id -- nlen ) {
839 x = make_pms_rsa(CTX, T0_POP());
841 br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, -x);
848 cc: do-ecdh ( echde prf_id -- ulen ) {
849 unsigned prf_id = T0_POP();
850 unsigned ecdhe = T0_POP();
853 x = make_pms_ecdh(CTX, ecdhe, prf_id);
855 br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, -x);
862 \ Write ClientKeyExchange
863 : write-ClientKeyExchange ( -- )
865 addr-cipher_suite get16
867 prf-id do-rsa-encrypt
870 addr-pad swap write-blob
872 dup use-ecdhe? swap prf-id do-ecdh
875 addr-pad swap write-blob
878 \ =======================================================================
880 \ Perform a handshake.
881 : do-handshake ( -- )
882 0 addr-application_data set8
883 22 addr-record_type_out set8
891 \ Session resumption.
893 -1 write-CCS-Finished
897 \ Not a session resumption.
901 \ Depending on cipher suite, we may now expect a
903 addr-cipher_suite get16 expected-key-type
904 CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN } and if
905 read-ServerKeyExchange
909 read-handshake-header
911 \ If this is a CertificateRequest, parse it, then read
914 drop read-contents-CertificateRequest
915 read-handshake-header
922 \ At that point, we should have a ServerHelloDone,
923 \ whose length must be 0.
924 14 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
925 if ERR_BAD_HELLO_DONE fail then
927 \ There should not be more bytes in the record at that point.
928 more-incoming-bytes? if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
931 \ TODO: client certificate support.
932 write-empty-Certificate
934 write-ClientKeyExchange
936 \ TODO: CertificateVerify
938 -1 write-CCS-Finished
942 \ Now we should be invoked only in case of renegotiation.
943 1 addr-application_data set8
944 23 addr-record_type_out set8 ;
946 \ Read a HelloRequest message.
947 : read-HelloRequest ( -- )
948 \ A HelloRequest has length 0 and type 0.
949 read-handshake-header-core
950 if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
951 if ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE fail then ;
955 \ Perform initial handshake.
959 \ Wait for further invocation. At that point, we should
960 \ get either an explicit call for renegotiation, or
961 \ an incoming HelloRequest handshake message.
971 0 addr-application_data set8
973 \ Reject renegotiations if the peer does not
974 \ support secure renegotiation. Theoretically
975 \ we could just ignore that, however if the
976 \ server sent an HelloRequest then it is
977 \ expecting a handshake and will wait for our
979 addr-reneg get8 1 = if
981 begin can-output? not while